The Narco-State

The impact of opium cultivation on the overall development of Afghanistan is probably among the most serious single issues the country has to face. Opium production reached a peak in 2007, that was not even reached under the Taliban rule in the 1990s. Since then, the production sharply dropped, although Afghanistan remains by far the largest producer of opium in the world. However, drug production in Afghanistan must be regarded as an integrated web of challenges. Brookings’ Felbab-Brown nicely outlines “narcotics production and counternarcotics policies in Afghanistan are of critical importance not only for the control of drugs there, but also for the security, reconstruction, and rule of law efforts in Afghanistan”.

Having said that, it might be worth looking at a recent UN report that made headlines. Focusing on the global impact of Afghanistan’s opium cultivation, the report Addiction, Crime and Insurgency : The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium, issued by UN’s Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) supports Felbab-Brown’s argument with numbers. Not least this latter publication is worth taking a closer look at the narco-business in Afghanistan. By enriching it with some other sources this piece should provide a brief overview of the narcotics production and its impact on Afghanistan and especially look at the interconnectedness of problems.

.

The Problem

In the 1990s, the production of illicit opiates (opium heroine and morphine) shifted from South-East Asia, especially Brima/Burma/Myanmar, to Afghanistan. Since then, Afghanistan is the biggest opium producer in the world with an estimated production of more than 90% of the global supply – approximately 3.500 tons of opium. Around the 2007, the Afghan drug economy has reached a peak, “unprecedented in the history of the modern drug trade at least since World War II”, as Brooking’s Vanda Felbab-Brown testifies. With an estimated annual revenue of US$65 billion (most of it outside Afghanistan), the market is larger than the GDP of more than 120 states in the world. However, this market does not only affect addiction and health issues in the world, but it also a major funding for criminals and insurgents. Therefore, UNODC’s executive director, Antonio Maria Costa, makes some popular comparisons in the beginning of the UNODC report:

The number of people who die from heroin overdoses in NATO countries per year (above 10.000) is five times higher than the total number of NATO troops killed in Afghanistan in the past 8 years, namely since the beginning of military operations since 2001.

The number of addicts in the Russian Federation has muliplied by 10 during the past 10 years, and they now consume a staggering 75-80 tons/year of Afghan heroin. More Russian people die from drugs per year  (at present 30.000-40.000, according to government estimates) than the total number of Red Army soldiers killed during the Soviet invasion and the ensuing 7-year Afghan campaign.

In fact, poppy cultivation in Afghanistan varies dramatically within the country. While the northern region is reported to have no poppy cultivation in 2009 at all, the west (18.800 hectares) and especially the southern part of the country (103.014 hectares) are the main cultivation areas. 98% of Afghan opium is produced in only 5 provinces, whith Helmand alone accounting for 60%.

.

Why growing poppy?

Among the most debated issues is the reason for farmers to cultivate poppy. Taking a look at the causes of opium production may give another indication about what to do. According to the Addiction, Crime, and Insurgency report (p. 97), the main reasons for opium cultivation are:

1. Lack of rule of law
2. Insecurity
3. Lack of off farm employment
4. Lack of water and agricultural infrastructure
5. Survival – provision of basic needs
6. External pressure from traffickers and traders
7. Exaggerated expectations of bilateral assistance through alternative livelihood activities
8. Lack of coping strategies without opium poppy income

Thus, the motivations can be categorised as a) lack of state; b) lack of economic possibilities; c) insecurity. The report further outlines that the reasons for growing poppy vary heavily throughout the country. Especially in the southern regions, religion plays a minor role, whereas “lack of respect to government is one [of] the reasons for poppy cultivation”. In addition, lack of security, lack of provision of basic needs, and external pressure impacts the farmer’s decision to grow poppy. One may sum it up as “because we can” or “because we have to” respectively. Almost the opposite is true for northern and central regions: religion and respect for the government are motivations for stopping poppy production.

.

2008: Turning point?

In 2008 the picture seemed to change. The Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009, issued as well by UNODC, sums up these successes, stating that “the bottom is starting to fall out of the Afghan opium market. For the second year in a row, cultivation, production, work force, prices, revenues and its GDP share are all down, while the number of drug free provinces and drug seizures continue to rise.” And, indeed, a look at the numbers supports this optimism: Cultivation decreased by 22% to 123,000 ha; the “potential production” of of opium decreased by 10% to 6.900 (metric) tons, population involved in opium poppy cultivation shrank from 13,7% in 2007 to 9,8% in 2008 and 6,4% in 2009. Prices felt by approimately 30%, the average yearly gross income in opium growing households shrank by 10% to US$1.186 while the share of the GDP is “only” 4% (compared to 7% in 2008).

.

Support for “Anti-Government Elements”

As the Addiction, Crime and Insurgency report nicely illustrates, already at the time of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan opiums was used as a major source of funding for the Mujahideen. At least since that time, there seems to be a close connection between insurgents / warlords and opium trade in Afghanistan. In his introductory statement Costa outlines that in the late 1990s the Taliban “tolerated opium cultivation and facilitated its export”. The generated revenue through direct taxes was not less than US$75-100 million per year. Taking into account that estimations expect Taliban fighters to receive about US$250 per month, it is an remarkable source of revenue. However, in the summer of 2000, facing a Security Council embargo, Taliban leader Mullah Omar banned opium cultivation. To see the enormous strength the Taliban had at that time, it is worth looking at the opium poppy production in 2001 (see graphic).  In 2001, opium production dropped sharply and was almost abandoned.

After 9/11 and the invastion of Afghanistan, drug problems have been considerably low on the agenda. International actors in Afghanistan neither were able to offer alternative job opportunities nor to provide enough forces to efficiently control the country. The obvious outcome was a massive increas in opium production. Accordingly, the report estimates revenues of US$350-650 millions within the time-frame of 2005-2008, mostly through all forms of “taxes”. It is worth noting that the average revenue from these years (US$90-160 million per year) is significantly higher than the numbers when the Taliban ruled the country and no international forces were present (US$75-100 million). As these years depicted the peak in opium production, it is likely that earnings decreased sharply since then, though they still remain at a high level.

In its annual Afghanistan report NATO sees a significant connection between drugs and the insurgency. “Experience on the ground demonstrates that opium production and insurgent violence are correlated geographically and opium remains a major source of revenue for both the insurgency and organized crime. The drugs trade also fuels corruption and undermines the rule of law.” Indeed, the simultaneous increase in security incidents and poppy cultivation since 2005 is undeniable. In addition, UNODC observes that following globally recognised business trends, Taliban are interconnecting with “normal” criminal groups, “moving up the value added chain of the drug trade”. As a general trend, they note, “it can now be said that all actors involved in destabilizing Afghanistan are directly or indirectly linked to the drug economy”.

It is worth noting that revenues from illegal drug trade are not limited to Taliban insurgents, but are “funding the insurgency in Central Asia, where the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Party of Turkmenistan, the East Turkistan Liberation Organization and other extremist groups are profiting from the trade.”

.

Lack of Seizure

One of the main failures in countering narcotics trade is the lack of seizure within Afghanistan, but also within the consuming states. Accordingly, the UNODC report states: “while 90% of the world’s opium come from Afghanistan, less than 2% is seized there.” In contrast, Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours, Iran (20% seizure rate), China (18%) and Pakistan (17%) perform by far much better. Even Colombia seizes 10 times more of its dope than Afghanistan does. However, generally the UNODC report complaints about low seizure rates. Globally, it is estimated that one fifth of opiates is seized, while Central Asian countries only seize around 5% of their 90 tons of heroin, Russia seizes 4%, and even South-Eastern European countries like Greece, Bulgaria and Romania seize less than 2%. Comparing Afghanistan to Colombia, Costa notes that in Colombia due to the increased seizures, purity decreased and prices increased.

.

Absence of law enforcement: “Justice is a market commodity”

Afghanistan’s lack of seizure is closely linked to the weakness of the state. With every dollar extremist and criminal groups earn, the government loses authority. Whereas tribal and family links are of major importance in the tribal areas, corruption is the drving force in all parts of Afghanistan. “At the source, in Afghanistan, corruption buys protection against eradication, facilitates illicit shipments, and guarantees impunity for drug traffickers” (UNODC). The fact that Afghanistan is among the top 2% of the most corrupt countries on a World Bank index and ranks #176 of 180 on the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International (only followed by Haiti, Iraq, Myanmar and Somalia), is at least one explanation for the low rates of seizures and the decreased eradication numbers.

Additionally, the lack of effort in the security sector worsens the problem, affecting almost all areas of the security sector. In its first edition, CIGI’s Security Sector Reform Monitor outlines a series of issues that affect efficient counter-narcotics efforts: “Both, petty and grant corruption are endemic in the ANP.” In addition, the report mentions auctionning of high-ranking ANP positions, “particularly along drug trafficking routes, by [Ministry of the Interor] officials for as much as US$50.000″. But even though the reform of the police in Afghanistan is a slow process, SSR Monitor outlines that “recent initiatives have shown some promise that the process could be turning a corner”.

Until Afghan security forces are capable of executing these operations on their own, it seems that international, especially US institutions take over that position. According to a statement by then DEA-chief of operation, Michael Braun, for the House of Representatives, since 2005 the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has “undertaken an aggressive approach to combat the production of opium in Afghanistan”. As Sharon Weinberger outlines, it seems that DEA teams up with US and special forces for that operation. However, despite the fact, that the Afghan government warned the US as early as 2007 about the results of eradication, only by June 2009 the United States shifted its policy.

In contrast to this slightly positive shift, the de facto absence of the judicial system has proven to be a major obstacle. SSR Monitor notes “Judicial infrastructure remains in a dire state, with the majority of courthouses and judicial offices requiring significant refurbishment or complete rebuilding”. Quoting a USAID report, it reads “many Afghans note that justice is a market commodity to be bought and sold, which is particularly troublesome in a society that values justice and honor”. On the basis of these developments is the accusation that the justice sector has been “chronically underfunded” (it received only 3% of the security sector expenditures in the fiscal years 03/04 and 04/05). Hence, Matteo Todini, former advisor to the Kabul embassy of the “lead-nation” Italy argues that there is a “growing lack of confidence among all stakeholders, as testified, e.g. by the huge number of US bilateral projects listed into the [National Justice Programme]“.

Hence, regarding the law-enforcement aspect it seems that a lack of seizure, integer security forces, good governance and the absence of a functioning justice sector obstacle effective fight against drugs. Afghanistan simply lacks proper state structures.

.

How to respond?

While in the long run only substantive state-building efforts will be able to counter the problem sustainably, success is needed quickly. However, quick-fixes are problematic, as it either implies eradication and thus driving farmers into poverty and providing “opposing forces” a basis to propagate themselves as “protectors of the people”. Or, awaiting a complex state-building process to take place is similarly problematic, as it further strengthens warlords and insurgents.

.

The macro-level: consolidate the security sector

Whereas this “hard approach” proves counterproductive for farmers, it may well be applied to counter traffickers, middlemen and warlords. Whereas it might be reasonable to earn money to survive, the most part of the revenue earned in Afghanistan is earned by this group. As the 2009 opium survey outlines, “[f]armers may grow it to stave off poverty. Criminals, insurgents and corrupt officials surely engage in its trade in the common pursuit of greed and power.” However, it is to say that international forces already addressed this threat. In the first half of 2009 Afghan and international forces’ “military operations destroyed over 90 tons of precursor chemicals, 450t of seeds, 50t of opium, 7t of morphine, 1.5t of heroin, 19t of cannabis resin and 27 labs. While this has knocked out only a fraction of the Afghan drug economy, it has increased the risks of drug trafficking, and created a deterrent for the future.”

However, in order to gain intelligence and knowledge about these backers, the Afghan police needs to be enabled to maintain the rule of law the critical regions. For the its counter-narcotics efforts, this requires a special counter-narcotics police force (that already exists). Additionally, Afghanistan requires community policing, meaning police forces that are present in the villages to provide security where the people need it. This creates state-presence in the communties but also generates intelligence about illicit activities. Only through such a web of local intelligence, special forces as the counter-narcotics police (CNP) and the intelligence service (NDS) are able to act against the masterminds. (As I argue regularly, this would require that the United States stop regarding & training the police as an “army light”, meaning an army with bad equipment.) However, the whole police is almost useless, as long as there is no functionning justice sector. If the police cannot give detainees to the justice authorities, because they’re either freed by using violence or freed by paying bribes, the whole system is basically useless. The United States will not be able to address this problem alone. Consolidating the security sector needs to be coordinated and comprehensive, e.g. in a re-phrasing of the security sector reform. This, however, is highly unlikely in the current environment. However, increased seizures, increased government authority decreased opium cultivation would be the outcome.

.

The micro-level: serve farmer’s needs

In addition to the security sector, it is crucial to look at the reasons for cultivating opium poppy. Security and presence of the state seems to be of major importance. However, of similar importance seems the lack of economic prospects among farmers. According to UNODC, almost half of the Afghan households depend on income from agriculture. And though Afghanistan’s GDP rose from 2002 to 2008 by 180%, economic growth still remains volatile with 53% of the Afghans still living below the poverty line. “Many Afghans cultivate their country with 15th century ploughs,” as an expert who recently returned from Afghanistan noted. An inflation rate of about 20% further leads to hardships among farmers. However, the UNODC report argues that poverty is by far not the only source for poppy cultivation:

“[f]armers in southern Afghanistan earn much more and are less indebted than other farmers in the country. The average land owning size is also high for farmers in the south, compared to other regions. If poverty were the only reason for opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, it would mean that i) Southern Afghanistan farmers became severely impoverished after 2002 after large-scale resumption of cultivation, and ii) other parts of Afghanistan are much richer than southern and western Afghanistan, which does not appear to be the case. Especially in central Afghanistan, farmers are much poorer than in other regions with a comparable level of debt. They do not, however, cultivate opium poppy on the same level as farmers in eastern, north-eastern and northern Afghanistan.

It becomes clear that poverty is not the sole reason for growing poppy, though it remains important. In addition, both UNODC reports see a vicious circle. “In Afghanistan, many farmers grow opium because they depend on loans provided by traders as a down payment for the subsequent drug harvest. Historically this has trapped farmers in debt bondage.” In order to counter this development, the report calls for micro credits and rural development. Through micro-credit, farmers would be enabled to buy and grow licit crops, whereas rural development mainly had to focus on infrastructure to transport, store and sell other, licit goods.

In her testimony, Felbab-Brown comes to a similar conclusion. “Rural development appropriately needs to lie at the core of the counternarcotics strategy because, despite the enormous challenges, it has the best chance to effectively and sustainably strengthen the Afghan state and reduce the narcotics economy”. However, to be effective, she writes, it need to be “conceived as broad- based social and economic development that focuses on improvements in human capital, including health care and education, and addresses all of the structural drivers of opium poppy cultivation”. Therefore, it seems, pure counter-narcotics programmes are hardly helpful as long as they are not integrated into a wider development concept. But, rather than demanding large increases in funds, Afghanistan mainly needs to coordinate assistance and lift their massive restrictions. UNODC outlines: ”the combination of individual foreign-sponsored projects around each PRT understandably, to protect the fighting boys), does not amount to a coherent assistance program for Afghanistan. In short, what is needed to consolidate recent gains, and to push the process torward are more assistance, greater coherence, and fewer bottlenecks at delivery.”

.

Conclusion

The massive and global impact of narcotics in Afghanistan has outlined an urgend need for action. An international market worth US$65 billion does not only cause harm to the social and economic development in Afghanistan, it also  kills thousands of people throughout the world. Addressing this problem has proven to be complex, as eradication will only worsen the problem in an impoverished and war-torn country like Afghanistan. Therefore, it was outlined that measures need to take place that include both, short-term and long-term solutions. While short-term solutions must focus on drug traffickers and criminal groups that control the narco-business, long-term solutions must focus on stateness throughout Afghanistan. As Felbab-Brown outlines

Aggressive efforts to suppress the drug trade typically backfire by allowing insurgents to pose as the population’s protectors and win further legitimacy. In contrast, a laissez-faire policy toward illicit crop cultivation can reduce support for the belligerents and, critically, increase cooperation with government intelligence-gathering. When combined with interdiction targeted at major traffickers, this strategy gives policymakers a better chance of winning both the war against the insurgents and the war on drugs.

Thus, a long-term solution must focus on interdiction and active fight of criminal networks that goes hand in hand with a coordinated widening of state structures. As it is so nicely expressed by UNODC’s Antonio Maria Costa in 2009’s NATO Afghanistan report let me conclude with this quote:

Progress depends on more than reducing the amount of opium hectarage : it depends on improving security, integrity, economic growth, and governance. We must concentrate on winning long-term campaigns, not just short-term battles.